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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the emergence of a Learning Legacy Agenda (LLA) in the wake of the 
London 2012 Olympic Games as a governmental tool for the dissemination of urban 
development and infrastructure project delivery best practice. Focusing on the inception, 
coordination and implementation of the LLA we outline the intentionalities of mobility that 
underpin its formation and appropriation and suggest how this points to the emergence of a 
new ‘London model’ of development and governance. Three intentionalities of knowledge 
capture, public duty, and extra-local salience are unpacked to demonstrate the range of ways 
in which the bureaucratically-initiated LLA banner has been used by various development 
actors and organisations to validate their existing practices.  The case study of the LLA as an 
institutionalised governance apparatus is used to analyse the impact of specific forms of social 
relations on the ways in which ‘models’ are produced, what their content consists of, how 
dominant agendas and narratives co-evolve with the priorities of an assemblage of actors, and 
the processes of selective abstraction used to curate particular messages and forms of fixed and 
potentially mobile knowledge, yet dubious claims of ‘learning’.   
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The 2012 Olympic Learning Legacy Agenda – the intentionalities of mobility for a new 
London model 
 
Introduction  
Contemporary urban governance is a diversifying sub-disciplinary field of study, traversing 
urban geography and critical planning and urban development theory. As a recent article by 
McCann (2016) suggests, urban governance studies grapple with future problematics and 
emergent framings of what constitutes ‘the good city’ through relational understandings of 
state, market and civil society interactions and assemblages. Debates concerning the spatial 
reach of governmental framings of cities as ‘models’ is increasingly common, popularised 
through the policy mobilities discourse of the last decade. In cities around the world, the search 
for the next ‘model’ of governance and urban development is taking place, seeking the best 
‘fit’ to bring economic efficiency, global or regional competitiveness and growth, along with 
cultural prosperity. This is not a new phenomenon, but the pace with which governance models 
‘travel’ has risen along with the expansion of global private sector expertise in development 
and finance. Major events and large urban projects, like the Olympic Games, bring with them 
heightened attention to the institutionally-lubricated channels through which policy and 
governance ideas take hold. New forms of technocratic governance, become normalised 
through such projects and enable policy-makers and private development interests to claim the 
best model is one which succeeds in taking the politics out of development. This paper looks 
in detail at the London Olympic planning and development programme and uses the production 
and dissemination of the so-called Learning Legacy Agenda to try to better understand the pre-
conditions of mobility underpinning the contention of an emergent new ‘London Model.’ 
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In 2010, at the height of preparations for the London 2012 Olympic Games, the  
Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA) launched its ‘Learning Legacy Agenda’ (LLA).  The LLA 
was designed to act as the primary vehicle for the dissemination of best practices to 
professionals involved in other urban development programmes and major infrastructure 
projects elsewhere.  The creation of the LLA represents a rare attempt to use the everyday 
practices and experiences of a specific urban project as a spring-board for the dissemination of 
development practices and models of governance, rather than a simple focus on place-
boosterism. Most of the research to-date on the legacies of mega-events, like Olympic Games, 
explores their wider effects on urban development strategies, regeneration outcomes, and 
sporting/cultural activities (e.g. Girginov and Hills, 2008; Poynter and MacRury, 2009 Poynter 
et al, 2012; Smith et al., 2011).  Much less has been written on their broader implications for 
governance and the contingent intentionalities of those involved to capture and circulate the 
knowledge(s) that they have acquired through their experiences of project management and 
delivery in a specific context.  
 
This paper interrogates the production of the LLA, considering both the changing 
intentionalities associated with its pre- and post-Games dissemination and the role of so-called 
‘middling technocrats’ (Larner and Laurie, 2010) in the fixing of particular forms of 
knowledge. Intentionalities, are here understood in a phenomenological sense as the 
unconscious ‘directedness’ or ‘aboutness’ of learning from given experiences and indirect 
inference-making on the basis of such experiences (Glendinning, 2007, p.37). This is different 
than ‘intentions’ which are understood to be more deliberate or conscious aims that guide 
considered action. Our focus on the LLA allows us to unpack the emergence of a potentially 
mobile governance ‘narrative’ or ‘agreed story’ (Bevir, 2013), sometimes referred to in our 
research as a new model, a term which suggests a formal abstraction, rather than our preferred 
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perspective as an assemblage of contingent activities. More specifically, the paper will unpack 
the production of a potentially-mobile governance ‘model’ in relation to its city of origin, 
London, the social relations and networks constituting its emergence, and the diverse and co-
evolving intentionalities for wider consumption and adaptation of the agenda presumed by its 
initiators (the ODA) and its dissemination partners and actualised by and for an extended 
audience of onlookers and would-be adopters.  In the process, we emphasise the importance of 
small ‘p’ politics or the myriad of mundane practices “often regarded as less important than 
larger institutionalised processes” (McCann and Ward, 2013, p. 10) and how these intersect 
with institutional discourses and logics circulating within and between agencies, organisations 
and individuals.  
 
In this analysis, we will draw on a broadly topological perspective (Allen, 2011; Allen 
and Cochrane, 2010; Allen and Cochrane, 2014), wherein the contemporary spatiality of the 
state is defined by the practices of a myriad of governmental actors drawn within its 
authoritative, rather than territorial, reach. This of course is not new to the study of governance, 
but the topological lens is infrequently operationalized in the study of travelling ideas and 
mobilisation of ‘models’. Such a lens allows us to investigate the confluence of these myriad 
practices and dialogics, culminating  in the production of governance models, such as those 
found in the LLA and its promotion of a management and delivery-focussed model of 
governance that simultaneously celebrates the successes of elite groups of experts and 
consultancies to lead and manage delivery, whilst establishing (but rhetorically downplaying) 
the close dependence of these agents on state power, regulations and spending.  We place 
critical focus not on the reification of centralised institutions as much as on the ‘decentring’ of 
governance practices understood as “contingent patterns of action occurring in specific 
contexts” (Bevir, 2013, p. 5).   
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A topological perspective addresses Roy’s (2012) assertion of the need to de-
universalise the mobility of the governance narrative from the practices which continue to 
mobilise it. Our study is based on an ethnographic investigation of the LLA process and 
outputs, combining a discursive analysis of publicly accessible materials with 13 face-to-face 
semi-structured interviews with key LLA actors, focusing on the “more private stories” (Larner 
and Laurie, 2010, p. 220) and reflections on the project and its mobility.  These were 
triangulated through an in-depth and systematic analysis of the materials and texts produced 
by the ODA and follow-up interviews with those who have sought to ‘use’ the London Olympic 
model to promote wider objectives and ambitions.  It should be stated however that our focus 
was on the intentionalities of the governance narrative or model, the so-called pre-conditions 
to mobility (Huxley, 2013), and less on an empirical verification of whether or not ‘real 
learning’ was taking place as the model was in-full, in-part, or in rhetoric alone, adopted. This 
will be returned to in the next section.  
 
The next section will discuss some of the broader literature on policy mobilities and 
topologies to situate the case study.  The paper then turns to the case study and begins by 
providing an overview of the LLA, setting out its inception, coordination, and implementation. 
We then explore the intentionalities of mobility that underpinned its formation and 
dissemination.  Consideration is given to the national and international promotion and take-up 
of the governance narrative, as well as an exploration of the range of ways the LLA banner is 
and has been used by different actors and organisations to support their own agendas. In so 
doing, the significance of the validation of existing practices amongst LLA producers, 
dissemination partners and their associated networks is highlighted. 
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Governance Topologies and the Circulation of Development Models 
 
The literature on urban politics has become increasingly concerned with the mobility of 
knowledges and the mobilisation of particular visions of how ‘to do’ urban policy.  As 
Cochrane and Ward (2012) argue, such research examines the ways in which tensions between 
different agencies and interests are worked through in particular contexts to create and produce 
policies in place, which are then mobilised and converted into a series of wider blueprints and 
frameworks.  The bigger question is therefore not whether a specific project, such as the 
Olympic Park, was a ‘success’ but how that success is produced and re-produced through the 
actions of agents and institutions (Peck and Theodore, 2010). As will be argued, the 
dissemination of the LLA was by and large orchestrated by a range of interests with the pre-
conditions of mobility inscribed within institutionally-specific channels and networks.  
 
These processes of knowledge transfer represent what Roy (2012) terms ethnographic 
circulations, or the interaction between those with ‘embodied knowledge’ who develop and 
implement policy programmes and blueprints for cities.  For Roy, it is imperative that 
researchers understand the form and character of these “ethnographic circulations that entail 
much more than a shift from an ethnography of locations to an ethnography of circulations” 
(2012, p. 34).  This requires a shift ‘from a study of mobile policy to the study of the practices 
through which policy is made mobile or how a parochial idea, rooted in time and place is 
rendered universal or at least transnational’ or greater attention paid to the ways in which 
policies are assembled together.  They are often given enhanced legitimacy because of who has 
been involved.  It is increasingly common for mobile policy models to entangle commercial 
interests of private companies and arms-length, non-governmental and lobbyist organisations 
with institutional objectives, priorities and favoured industry alignments. 
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These assemblages of actors draw on a variety of sources of power and knowledge.  
Thinking topologically, models appear through non-linear processes mediated through real-
time connections “wherein the pervasive quality of the state’s authority is inseparable from the 
social relationships that comprise it” (Allen and Cochrane, 2010, p. 1074). Such ‘models’ or 
other circulating abstract ideas are the product of expert networks and communities of practice 
(Clarke, 2012) co-constituted by the practices of situated interpretative communities (Lee and 
LiPuma, 2002). This, Allen and Cochrane (2010) suggest, marks not a re-scaling or re-
distribution of institutional hierarchies but the re-assemblage of state hierarchical powers in 
terms of spatial reach. “Power and authority...are not so much seeping away from the corridors 
or Whitehall as being subject to renegotiation and displacement by the political actors drawn 
within reach” (p.1074).  
 
Thus, to understand production and circulation of a model requires the de-
universalisation of its composition and following. As Peck and Theodore (2010) argue, models 
are not models without followers and a model can only enrol followers if it holds the promise 
of “extra-local salience” (p. 171). They suggest that some models achieve mobility because 
they have ‘in some way or another been ideologically anointed or sanctioned’ (Ibid), perhaps 
by coming from the ‘right place’ they invoke certain associations of best practice. Dominant 
models can therefore be interpreted as “creature[s] of dominant interests, travelling from 
centres of authority along politically constructed and ideologically lubricated channels” (Peck 
and Theodore, 2010, p. 170). Increasingly however, the ‘centres of authority’ are not 
government departments and agencies but the complex assemblage of firms, consultancies, 
agencies and organisations that constitute a decentralized governance field who have refined 
and aligned their agendas into development models and best practices ready-packaged as 
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functional universals and re-circulated narratives of success through their own national and 
international networks.  
 
Methodologically speaking, the exploration of model formation thus requires an 
investigation of the social and institutional relations through which such narratives are 
assembled and converted into transferable simplifications.  Those responsible for providing the 
template to ‘repeat the trick’ are those ‘middling technocrats’ (Larner and Laurie, 2010; Roy, 
2012) who possess the embodied knowledge to develop and implement governmental 
programmes and systems in cities like London. Roy (2012) suggests that the social practices 
of these (increasingly transient) practitioners and bureaucrats constitute the ethnographic 
circulations that should be prioritised in any attempt to study the mobility of models and 
narratives of best practice. The emphasis, she argues, need not be on the mobile policy or 
programme, but on the practices through which these are made mobile. The formation of so 
called ‘best practice’ must be viewed as a governmental technology or instrument that promotes 
aligned political rationalities and supports their translation and mobility (Bulkeley 2006; 
Moore 2013). 
 
In many cities, there is what Healey (2007) terms an increasingly ‘restless search’ to 
identify forms of governance and development that will help to produce enhanced economic 
growth.  Cities are under intense pressure to boost their competitiveness and this has led to a 
greater interest in the capacity of different governance models to enable growth to flourish and 
to demonstrate that state powers and regulations are being used in a more efficient and effective 
manner.  There is a growing emphasis on the creation of iconic places where development has 
‘happened’, with examples of Barcelona, Baltimore and Vancouver endemic to the illustration 
of how approaches to urban problems and development programmes get reduced to stylized 
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one-dimensional models that get ‘moved’ by governance actors – thus taking on the 
characteristics of “reified avatars” (McCann and Ward, 2012, p. 47).   
 
One can therefore question or probe the networks between the sites of knowledge 
production, capture and adaptation and the presumed overlapping ideological orientations and 
congruent political projects (Peck and Theodore, 2010). This might involve taking up 
McCann’s (2013) challenge of linking the study of the extra-local projection of models with 
boosterism through detailed investigation of supply-side (success stories propagated by those 
with an interest in marketing the approach) and demand-side (the motivations and conditions 
of those who are receptive to models and approaches from elsewhere).  
 
Concomitantly, the search for new governance models has co-evolved with the rise of 
global private sector expertise and the increasing power and influence of multi-national 
corporations that promote and provide templates of good governance. Some, including the so-
called ‘Big 4’ (Ernst&Young, PriceWaterHouseCoopers, Deloitte, KPMG) have set out clear 
blueprints for the ‘good governance’ of cities, based on the principles established by global 
bodies such as the United Nations and the World Bank (Raco, 2014). At the same time, global 
firms working in the sectors of engineering, project management and construction have also 
become key players and in some instances the same actors may even move from project to 
project taking their knowledge of what governance arrangements ‘work best’ with them. The 
growing congruence between the emergence of these actors and the increasing appetite for 
cities to consume or follow iconic templates of success is codifying and institutionalising new 
forms of technocratic governance, in which, as Putnam (1976) noted, ‘technics must replace 
politics’ and political conflict. Efficient and effective models of how to govern, manage, and 
deliver urban projects are mobilised to enable policy-makers and experts to pre-empt and 
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manage the messiness associated with place-based conditions, disruptions and potentials for 
conflict.  
 
In the remainder of the paper we now turn to the case of the London Olympics and the 
emergence of the LLA as a specific institutionalised governance and development model to 
analyse the impact of specific forms of social relations on the ways in which models are 
produced, what their content consists of, how dominant agendas and narratives co-evolve with 
the priorities of an assemblage of actors, and the processes of selective abstraction used to 
curate particular messages and forms of knowledge.  The extent to which ‘learning’ has actually 
occurred is less transparent in the analysis. To know who is ‘learning’ and what practices have 
changed in the industry because of the collation of the LLA would need to involve a more 
detailed ethnographic investigation of knowledge construction, translation and dissemination 
practices in the complex contractual terrain of construction and development supply chains, 
both domestically and internationally. As will be noted later, those involved in co-producing 
the LLA were not very pro-active in monitoring its reach to enable us to infer the extent to 
which real sector-based ‘learning’, in the sense of meaning creation, identity and community 
(re)construction, and practice-based change (Wenger, 1998), was taking place. ‘Learning’ in 
the original framing of the LLA was limited to capturing existing knowledge and the validation 
of this as best practice; it was not about innovation and the promotion of deep learning. The 
output was primarily the presentation of an online repository, supported by some dissemination 
events to inform rather than engage in a participatory sense the target audience of professionals. 
Ultimately, the original goal of the LLA ‘project’ was to gather technical knowledge and curate 
it for inter-referencing purposes as a toolkit of tried-and-tested approaches. Dissemination and 
‘learning’, at the outset was of less importance than minimizing the net loss of existing 
knowledge from such a one-off large urban development project.  Whilst this might have been 
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the ODA’s original aim, this was not the motivation of many of the dissemination partners as 
will be seen through the discussion of co-evolving intentionalities.  
 
A Learning Legacy Agenda 
 
The LLA was originally an attempt by individuals and units within the ODA to document the 
work that had been carried out on the Olympic sites and the wider lessons for policy-makers, 
developers, and other technical experts working on regeneration and infrastructure projects 
elsewhere.  Work on the LLA started in June 2010 with the stated aim to, 
 
share the knowledge and lessons learned from the London 2012 construction project to 
raise the bar within the construction sector and to act as a showcase for UK plc . 
(Learning Legacy, 2013, p. online).   
 
Prompted initially by a House of Commons Public Accounts Committee report in 2010 
recommending that the ODA would be well-placed to lead in identifying lessons from the 
Games’ ‘flagship programme’ for other construction projects, the LLA initiative was unlike 
anything developed by any previous hosts of the Games.  It was not driven by the International 
Olympic Committee, who have an operationally-focussed learning programme between host 
cities but do not require any knowledge from the delivery experience to be made publicly 
available.  Indeed, there was no legal or contractual obligation to produce a LLA and at the 
time there was little demand-side incentive to accumulate knowledge or narratives of good (or 
bad) practice other than the nudge in the Select Committee report.  
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The ODA took on the co-ordinating role and acted, in the words of one manager, “more 
like a consultation [service], consulting the industry for what lessons learned they were 
interested in hearing”. It established relationships and dialogues with professional bodies in 
key sectors; particularly those involved in engineering and construction. Initially, the LLA 
received no core funding and was facilitated on a voluntary basis by those managing different 
aspects of the development (the ‘theme leaders’) and others, including academics, who were 
asked to provide briefing papers and project overviews. Gradually, bodies such as the Institute 
for Civil Engineers [ICE] and the Health and Safety Executive [HSE] supported specific 
outputs that were seen as particularly relevant to their members and future regeneration 
activities. The ODA contributed 40% of the costs itself. Through these consultations, the ODA 
sought to identify both core process-outcomes, through ‘lessons learned’, and more tangible 
objects of intervention that became known as ‘Champion Products’. Most importantly, there 
was an attempt to give legitimacy to the wider Olympic project within London that was 
generating growing criticism, particularly in the wake of the financial crisis.  The ODA 
developed a clear governance narrative that the Games were delivered on time (a big build 
construction programme delivered a year ahead of the Games), that they were delivered on 
budget (against the anticipated £6.8bn cost), that they were fit for purpose (designed for 
legacy as well as the Games themselves) and that the achievements in all the priority theme 
areas were above industry benchmarks (Elson, 2012). 
 
The scope, form and content of the LLA were determined internally by the ODA-appointed 
project manager. As part of the scoping exercise, ODA staff were asked to consider the 
following prompts:  
 What did we do that was innovative? 
 Could it be replicated on future projects and programmes? 
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 What did we do badly and what would we do differently on the next project? 
 Is there an audience for these lessons learned? 
 What industry experts/representatives can we partner with to help collate the lessons 
learned and/or support the dissemination? 
 Who can validate the findings as best practice? 
(Elson, 2012).  
 
Instigators of the LLA within ODA intended to capture ‘lessons learned’ before people moved 
on to other projects so that there was no loss of intellectual capital.  The scoping exercise, 
informed by consultation with industry, professional and academic partners, led to the decision 
to produce material relating to 10 priority themes.1   
 
Over 250 documents were produced in late 2010 and early 2011 in a variety of different 
formats and lengths (Table 1).  The production process reflected the wider delivery of the 
Olympics, with the ODA providing a framework and the co-ordination but much of the work 
and authorship of these documents was conducted by private sector practitioners working for 
the delivery partner, CLM, or its numerous contractors such as Atkins, Arup, Balfour Beatty 
and KLH Sustainability.  The research papers were authored by professional bodies and 
partners from academia, who were also involved in peer reviewing the documents produced.  
In total, our content analysis identified 93 staff from different organisations involved in the 
authorship of the LLA materials.  Figure 1 illustrates the organisations employing practitioners 
producing the most documents, and the interconnections between the documents relating to the 
different priority themes, giving a sense of how the production of the LLA was a complex 
                                                           
1 Design and engineering innovation; equality, inclusion, employment and skills; health and safety; 
masterplanning and town planning; procurement and supply chain management; project and programme 
management; sustainability; systems and technology; transport; and archaeology. 
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institutional assemblage.  The documents were written with a primary audience of practitioners 
working in similar fields, and are essentially a set of ‘how to’ instructions in various formats. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
Following peer review, the documents were published online on a dedicated website in 
October 2011. The website was called a ‘goldmine of knowledge’ in a UK Cabinet Office 
report (UK Government, 2012) and was transferred to be hosted by the Cabinet Office to ensure 
its continued existence after the ODA’s demise. By September 2012 the website had already 
been viewed by over 43,000 people, 35% of whom were from overseas (UK Government, 
2012).  The most popular themes were environment and sustainability, followed by health and 
safety, project and programme management and design and engineering.  Although most of the 
documents were produced pre-Games, following the perceived success of the Games, further 
documents were added to the LLA website, which grew to over 400 documents by 2013 (UK 
Government, 2013). 
 
As well as publishing the documents, the LLA’s dissemination strategy also involved 
the hosting of a series of events by eleven dissemination partner agencies (See Table 2) related 
to professional and regulatory benchmarks in key standards (particularly around engineering 
and construction) with whom the ODA had established relationships and dialogues. The ODA 
were keen to involve a range of partners to ensure better dissemination of the material; as one 
ODA official told us,  
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We as the ODA are not trying to tell anybody anything. We are the client, it was our 
budget, our money, we led the project but these are written by a whole raft of 
organisations…”. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
These events comprised over 150 key actors from the range of organisations and contractors 
responsible for delivering the Games being designated as ‘Learning Legacy Ambassadors’ and 
then delivering a series of over 50 seminars, workshops and master classes with the partner 
organisations throughout 2012 across the UK, which were attended by over 4,000 people. A 
number of follow-up events were then arranged internationally by UKTI and the British 
Council in 2012 and 2013.  These events were aimed at actors involved in similar roles for 
other projects or organisations who will be interested in the embodied knowledge and 
experience of the ‘ambassadors’.  They were thus meetings of ‘middling technocrats’ where a 
physical co-presence allowed the development of common understandings about the best way 
to approach particular problems and promote policy mobility (Stone, 2004).  However, it is 
also important to note that surprisingly few resources went into monitoring the impact of the 
LLA portal and events, so there is little evidence to support claims of ‘success’ as a legacy for 
UK-based construction and development projects. Who exactly the ‘learning’ was aimed at 
was also unclear, as the events often engaged the existing networks of the dissemination 
partners, showcasing current rather than innovative practice.  
 
In the remaining sections, we focus on the complex intentionalities of the assemblages 
of different actors and agencies involved in the production of the LLA, before turning to the 
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evolution of an iconic London model and the processes involved in fixing and mobilising 
specific forms of selective knowledge. 
 
Intentionalities and Social Relations of Model Formation 
 
In the discussion above we have highlighted some of the formal objectives, priorities, and 
structures of the LLA.  In our research, we uncovered a number of intersecting intentionalities 
that evolved into the formal LLA.  For those involved in setting up the LLA first, and foremost, 
it was presented as a means of capturing knowledge and experience in a way that would be 
accessible to regeneration professionals and policy-makers elsewhere. Development projects 
are, by their nature, carried out in a compartmentalised and fragmented way with experts 
moving from one project to the next and spending relatively little time reflecting on their 
actions (see Bentley and Rafferty, 1992). For some within the ODA, the LLA could therefore 
be used to showcase some of the ‘successful’ practice-based activities and management 
structures that underpinned the Olympic programme. In the words of one ODA official, with 
an engineering and project-management background, the LLA had been prompted by the 
observation that,  
 
people typically come and go and projects lose all their intellectual capital…it remains 
in the heads of those involved but they move on to another project.  Rarely are they 
formally captured in a meaningful way. 
 
A core objective for the LLA was therefore to “try and write down some of the things 
we’ve done, loosely around some priority themes” (Interview ODA Senior Manager). It was 
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not originally designed to form the basis of a model or a wider political agenda to transfer neo-
liberal practices to other contexts. 
 
As one ODA official commented, the spreading of ‘best practice’ was a vital goal for the LLA: 
 
Best practice … I think there is a genuine feeling that they want other people to have 
the chance to learn.  I don’t think we do enough of it.  I’d like to do a lot more… We 
want to shout about it, there’s all this good stuff, there’s all these other programmes 
and projects going on now. 
 
This was very much presented in terms of technical expertise and the chance for those involved 
in the particular tasks of delivering the Olympics to then share these experiences with other 
actors involved in similar fields in other projects. 
 
Those involved with the LLA were keen to emphasize that the Games had been 
delivered using the best of “proven existing tools and knowledge” rather than acting as a 
particular forum for innovation for actors working at all scales of development, not only mega-
projects. ODA respondents frequently used the term ‘leading edge, not bleeding edge’ to make 
this point in relation to its own activities.  Its focus on delivery meant that it had relatively little 
scope for major innovations that might fail, so that according to one private sector project 
manager from an LLA dissemination partner, this made it,  
 
quite a straightforward, easy thing to be involved in because some of the technical 
challenges weren’t great because a lot of what we had done had already been done 
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before.  We weren’t innovators…it was really the scale and the rigour that we 
brought to it. 
 
This absence of innovation, paradoxically, made the idea of creating a transferable set of ideas 
easier as it meant that there were relatively simple lessons that others could take away.  But the 
actual take-up and influence of these ‘lessons’ was not monitored closely by most of the 
dissemination partners, rather it seemed of secondary importance to capturing and documenting 
existing ‘good’ practice.  The intention was specifically to showcase practices and the impacts 
that experts could and more accurately, do already, make on urban development projects when 
provided with the right types of governance arrangements and resources. 
 
A second rationale was that for some respondents the creation of the LLA was presented 
as a public duty.  The Games was the biggest single area-based urban intervention in the history 
of British urban policy, with an eventual spend in-excess-of over £9billion.  ODA actors, in 
interview, argued that they had a moral and ethical obligation to expla in how the money had 
been spent and the management practices that underpinned the development.  The voluntary 
nature of much of the original work meant that for many of those involved, the LLA proved to 
be something of a burden that was undertaken as a public duty, with one ODA Planning staffer 
stating the LLA was “the bane of [his] life”.  Another senior ODA director remarked:  
 
we had no philosophical or expected outcomes in terms of how we are going to change 
the world….[it was] not about ODA telling anybody how to do it, that would be too 
arrogant.  What we are saying is these things went on, we did some of them, others did 
others.  You can read from a variety of subjects and take from it what you will.  It is not 
a targeted message, there is no agenda, simply a library. 
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The whole programme, it was claimed, was non-ideological and non-political.  It was to be a 
“pick list of information, approaches, techniques, the thinking that went on behind it, outcomes, 
results” (Interview, ODA Senior Official). It was founded on the principles of a realistic 
politics that promised to deliver manageable and tangible outcomes, untainted by significant 
political interference or ideologies.  The role of the assemblage of state bodies involved in the 
governance of the project was to keep political interference to a minimum and to use state 
power to reach out and enforce the agreements it had made to deliver the project.  The extent 
to which this is the case was demonstrated in 2013 when Sir John Armitt, former Chair of the 
ODA, was commissioned by the Labour Party to produce a review on how to improve future 
infrastructure delivery in the UK.  This report recommended adoption of the Olympic delivery 
partner model to ‘take the politics out of infrastructure’ (Armitt, 2013).   
 
A third set of intentionalities also became clear in our interviews and these have become 
increasingly significant and powerful.  There has been an attempt to establish and build on the 
extra-local salience of the LLA and use the Olympics as a platform from which to establish 
broader economic and political messages.  The LLA thus became embedded in a broader 
political project; the desire to curate an international model that would showcase ‘UK plc’ as 
an assemblage of public and private actors working as a coherent entity and in competition 
with other national economies.  As noted above, this theme is now mentioned repeatedly on 
the LLA website and forms part of its core mission statement.  This is illustrative of the 
considerable fluidity around the audience of the LLA and reasons for actor involvement over 
time.  The growing focus on UK plc on the international stage was in the words of one ODA 
manager an “added benefit, not intentional”. The UK Government itself wasted little time in 
organising the ‘GREAT Britain’ international marketing campaign to champion the success of 
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the Games and profile the capabilities of UK plc to attract inward investment in UK-based 
development projects and to encourage UK success in securing high-value international 
contracts abroad. In 2012 UKTI set a target to use the Games to generate £11 billion of trade 
and investment for the UK by 2016. Proclaiming by July 2013 that £9.9 billion of economic 
benefits, 90% of the four-year target had been attained in just one year. £1.5 billion of this was 
attributed to Olympic-related high-value opportunities won overseas in particular for work on 
other major sporting projects, such as Sochi 2014 and Rio 2016 (HM Government and Mayor 
of London, 2013).  Central Government’s promotion of the LLA’s ‘lessons learned’ platform, 
and eventually a brand, in order for UK plc to be vaulted into a leadership role on the 
international development stage sits in rather stark contrast to the humble (domestic) aims 
proclaimed by the LLA originators.    
 
It is a message that has been taken up with vigour by the UKTI.  Its clear intention has 
been to use the LLA to promote British firms and the UK’s modernised ‘pro-business’ 
approach to planning.  As one UKTI senior manager recalled,  
 
the key message is that the Games were delivered on time and on budget.  That’s the 
message we push…and that helps companies associated with realising that…The 
2012 contractors should be selling themselves on the basis of their fantastic project 
delivery for the Games.  They can articulate their involvement and it will help them 
tell their story.  
 
British Embassies and trade delegations around the world now use the LLA as a springboard 
for marketing campaigns to attract foreign direct investment and to encourage public bodies in 
cities across the world to adopt a London Model of development, along with the private firms 
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who ‘made it happen’. The LLA has enabled UKTI to “bust a number of persistent myths about 
London and the UK, for example that our public transport system is poor”, whilst 
simultaneously acting as “a big networking event for corporates” (Interview, UKTI Senior 
Manager).  It is seen as enhancing the reputational capital of UK firms, even though many of 
those involved in the delivery of the Games were not UK-based. 
 
Yet it is not just the UK Government’s promotion of the LLA which has evolved 
beyond the original intentionalities of the LLA.  A number of institutions, in both the public 
and private sectors have used the LLA as a platform for greater recognition and association.  
Both public and private actors wanted to demonstrate just how effective their practices had 
been and sought to use the example of the Games to support wider agendas.  For private 
companies, any Olympic-based activities are subject to the IOC’s complex rules on sponsorship 
and official branding that preclude non-official sponsors from benefitting directly from Games 
marketing. Many firms interviewed for this research expressed their frustration with these 
restrictions as they prevented them from openly marketing their activities and Olympic 
‘successes’ to potential clients elsewhere.  In the words of one Olympics-contracted 
construction firm director, 
 
the massive frustration for me and a lot of people that we seem to have impressed with 
the Olympics, was that there were all these Olympic rules around on ‘no marketing’ 
and we had to sign up to that and say that we weren’t to mention what we’d done on 
the project. 
 
For the ODA, the LLA therefore opened up what one senior official referred to as,  
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a way of allowing some kudos, because of the benefits that have arisen out of the 
success.  They have their name and company on the LLA documents and this was one 
reason we got them involved in the first place.   
 
In this manner, the LLA acted as a springboard for private companies to market their activities 
and to demonstrate that they have the capacity to deliver and manage urban projects of this size 
and scale.   
 
From the research interviews, it is clear there was much to be gained for those agencies 
that could demonstrate that their activities had (or will) contribute to the imagined 
competitiveness of the ‘UK economy’ (the shorthand term ‘UK Plc’ was widely invoked) and 
the private sector, and the LLA provided a high-profile platform to do so. The HSE, for 
example, was heavily involved in all stages of the Olympics and saw the LLA as an opportunity 
to demonstrate how effective its actions have been.  The Coalition government had made it 
clear that it saw ‘unnecessary’ Health and Safety regulations as a brake on development and 
the HSE, more broadly, had been subject to repeated public attacks on its legitimacy, 
particularly from business interests (see O’Neil, 2013).  The Olympics provided a high-profile 
opportunity for the HSE to show that regulations could be used to promote both enhanced 
safety and profitability.  Its executives pointed to the management processes through which 
regulations were negotiated and enforced, and the monitoring schemes it established, as 
examples of best practice that should be rolled-out to construction projects across the UK and 
beyond.  It also highlighted the fact that there were no fatalities in the construction of the 
Olympic sites; a real achievement for a construction project of this size and scale.  The HSE 
has therefore used the LLA to stress that it should now be involved directly in development 
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projects elsewhere.  It has embraced the LLA and funded some of its outputs. It sees the LLA 
as a platform for the building of a transferable model of regulation. 
 
Other public bodies have also taken the opportunity offered by the LLA to draw 
attention to the alignments that exist between their practices and the ‘reformist’ agendas of 
central government. For instance, a variety of bodies have sought to demonstrate how their 
involvement in the delivery of the Olympics reflects the UK government’s objective of 
encouraging widespread privatisation and private-led urban project management.  Those public 
bodies able to demonstrate their ability to forge close working relationships with dynamic and 
successful private sector companies believe that they will enhance their credibility with policy-
makers.  The LLA thus gives legitimacy to those calling for more hybrid forms of policy-
making and more entrepreneurial modes of governance.  In the post-Games period interviewees 
reported that the economic ‘dividends’ that resulted from the Games have taken on a greater 
prominence and that public and private organisations were taking the opportunity to use the 
Games as a showcase for how their own activities and sources of expertise had economic value. 
 
This has been reflected in subsequent formal government evaluations of the benefits of 
the Games that present the success of British companies in acquiring development contracts 
elsewhere through the LLA, as a form of legacy benefit (see HM Government and Mayor of 
London, 2013).  Whilst the language of the LLA is that of best practice and wider learning, 
some private companies have found it an important avenue through which to promote their 
own activities.  This was partly because, in the words of contracted construction firm 
representative, “being a very publicly focused project the world was looking at us and we were 
to keep our noses clean and be whiter than white”.  But it was also partly because firms and 
individuals within them felt that they had innovative and successful practices that they wanted 
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to promote. The LLA provided the apparatus through which this good practice, based on the 
activities of an elite group of private developers, could be converted into effective forms of 
public-private working and new governance frameworks. As one senior ODA official 
suggested, the LLA documents and events provided the potential for economic dividends and 
improved reputations “because of the benefits that have arisen out of the success”, with 
companies and indeed specific individuals having their names on LLA documents.  Similarly, 
another ODA official noted that, 
 
[the LLA] does a number of things …   it does a lot for their own personal and career 
development, being able to stand up and talk about things and share their experiences.  
It promotes the company in a good light.  It throws what the UK has done in a good 
light as well.  So, there are lots of reasons to do it. 
 
This focus on the individual actor is important in charting the evolution of the LLA’s 
utilisation, and accords with Larner and Laurie’s (2010) concern with the role of the ‘middling 
technocrat’ in the dissemination of new practices associated with economic globalisation. 
 
For other public bodies, there was also a perceived political dividend in demonstrating 
that their activities had had a positive impact on the quality of the Olympic development and 
the success of the master planning process.  The broad assemblage of those involved in the 
LLA meant that NGOs were also provided with a platform to promote their own activities and 
to disseminate the different elements of a London model. Some organisations, such as the UK 
Green Building Council [UKGBC] or the Institution of Engineering and Technology [IET] 
have used it as a core feature of their own dissemination activities with professionals, 
practitioners, and others involved in education and training.   As a representative of the 
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UKGBC noted, the ODA made it clear to them that, “it was up to partners to disseminate…so 
it became a question of what is the LLA and where is it going and how to anticipate getting the 
most out of its production”.  Rather than representing a clearly defined model that was being 
used to promote the interests of development companies, those involved in taking the LLA 
beyond the initial activities of the ODA found that the process was, in the words of one UKGBC 
interviewee “quite confusing around what we could and couldn’t do and frustrating”.  The 
specifics of the LLA were therefore open to interpretation and re-use.   
 
The UKGBC has played an important role in disseminating some of the LLA’s core 
messages on sustainability and construction.  For some within the ODA, the Olympics provided 
an opportunity to bring about significant changes in the attitudes of the construction and 
engineering sectors towards sustainability planning.  In the words of one of the ODA’s 
sustainability team, 
 
we were trying to change what the face of construction, so when you look at the 
Olympics as a high-profile project, you are probably going to get the biggest new 
technologies and major firms and that may be a great opportunity to work with them to 
change the way they might do or want to do things.  
 
The core target audiences according to the same interviewee were, 
 
the design and construction industry.  So we were trying to write the papers so that 
they would be read by the industry and we had some notions for them to 
consider….our main aim is to try and change an industry which is regarded as 
backwards in terms of this agenda.   
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However, another senior director within the ODA provided a contradictory take on the target 
audience and the aims of the LLA acting as a “library of reference” for the future use of the 
target audience:  
 
the target audience were public and private clients in development and regeneration, 
professionals (designers, architects, engineers, contractors) and academia. Not all 
the construction industry…We had no philosophical or expected outcomes in terms 
of how we are going to change the world. 
 
A key component of these wider changes was the mobilisation of the UKGBC to act as conduit 
for the ODA’s sustainability models.  As the same respondent noted, 
 
we needed to go through another organisation…[as] we wanted a body that could 
continue to hold our papers and make them available and also we wanted a body where 
actually there was a link to what we were doing and to trade associations which are 
associated with sustainable construction and standardised construction agendas. 
 
The UKGBC was selected to run a series of events and workshops as part of the LLA and to 
promote the ODA’s sustainability programmes. The emphasis has been on how to bring 
sustainability requirements into contract and procurement practices; the monitoring of 
outcomes; and key points of intervention in project life-cycles.  For the UKGBC the LLA 
opened up new opportunities to promote its own activities and the LLA has been absorbed and 
adapted to meet its own agendas and needs. 
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The same is true for other NGO bodies.  Educational and industry trusts such as the IET 
were “very keen to get the Olympic message across” right from the outset.  The organisation 
was taken on by the ODA as an official partner and the LLA Partner for Transport.  Its core 
function was to disseminate knowledge, best practices, and lessons learned from the Games.  
But the IET has a wider educational remit to promote engineering knowledge amongst non-
engineers and to work with schools and others to encourage more young people to go into 
engineering professions.  The open nature of the ODA’s LLA meant that it became an 
opportunity space for these different interests with very diverse intentions.  As one private 
sector dissemination partner representative noted in interview, 
 
From my perspective, there wasn’t a well-developed strategy for LLA within the 
ODA…which was helpful, it was a probe in that sense, because it meant that wherever 
we had the opportunity we were almost guiding and steering the ODA into how they 
should do it.  It was not top down. 
 
In this section, the intentionalities of those involved in producing and disseminating the LLA 
have been unpacked. One set of intentionalities focused on the national scale and one on the 
international. Both compel closer examination of the nexus of rationalities assembling as sites 
of knowledge production, capture, adaptation and circulation (Peck and Theodore 2010). In the 
final section, we explore the pre-conditions for mobility (Huxley 2013) inscribed within 
institutionally-lubricated channels that have enabled the LLA to take on the characteristics of 
a new ‘London model’. 
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From a Learning Legacy Agenda to a Transferable London Model?   
 
The original objectives of the LLA have evolved and gradually become enmeshed in the wider 
politics and practices of contemporary, post-recession governance.  The LLA has increasingly 
become the basic checklist for a model of how ‘to do’ development based on the principles of 
contract-led project management and sustainability planning.  In the words of a key LLA 
director, the approach to sustainable urban development enshrined in the Olympics project 
came to constitute,  
 
a London model.  That is, set up your policy and strategy on day one, drive it through 
with measurable targets, embed it into design and construction, incentivise people in 
terms of reputations and personal ethos and professionalism to drive them through, 
look at innovative ways of delivering against them, measure them vigorously and 
publish those regularly…this is a London model. 
 
The model seeks to build on the LLA’s work to improve the competitiveness of the UK 
construction industry and to turn British firms into world leaders in urban regeneration.  The 
LLA was originally perceived as a domestic demonstration of how applying principles of good 
practice regardless of project scale and location could be done within the existing tools 
available to producers. In other words, it was the best of the ordinary rather than the exceptional 
or extraordinary that were being showcased in order to demonstrate the potential for 
improvement across the domestic construction and development industry and to bring 
standards up across the sector.  So, the original intentionality of the LLA was an attempt by 
middling technocrats within the ODA to document the work that had been carried out on the 
Olympic sites and the wider lessons for policy-makers, developers, and other technical experts 
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working on projects elsewhere, mainly in the UK and within the private sector.  The UK 
Government made it clear that through the LLA ‘the ODA has provided a model for success 
that is transferable to other UK construction projects’ (Morrell in Elson, 2013, online).  Yet, 
in the words of one private sector dissemination partner representative “for big projects you 
need big people involved” and multinational firms have been more than happy to promote this 
message.  The LLA has therefore created a model that lends itself to more elitist forms of 
project management as only multinational firms have the capacity to ‘deliver’ on new 
regulatory requirements and the push for ‘quality’ urban development.  Some interviewees in 
the construction sector, for instance, welcomed the introduction of enhanced regulations over 
H&S requirements and environmental sourcing of materials as, in effect, this limited the 
opportunities for smaller firms to take a leading role in future projects.  It was felt this would 
increase quality as “there are no cowboys2 amongst the big boys” (Interview, LLA 
Dissemination Partner). Similarly, there was a call for government to use the London Model 
and the LLA to mandate certain types of contracts to be used for all public-sector infrastructure 
projects.   
 
In the case of the LLA and the London Olympics more generally, a new governance 
narrative is therefore being proposed that represents both a reformed governance system and 
the introduction of new technologies of governance.  The LLA follows the increasing tendency 
for development models or approaches to be concerned with setting out clear ‘how to’ 
instructions for practitioners within and beyond the immediate context in which they emerged. 
Despite a clear boundedness to the contextual origins of such approaches with territories of 
action identified and targeted for special attention, the broader circumstances within which 
                                                           
2 The reference to ‘cowboys’ is a British colloquialism for those engaging in unscrupulous, incompetent, poor 
quality and/or unethical business practices. 
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these practices arise and how these support, or threaten the coherence of best practices and 
models is deliberately downplayed and relegated to that of a series of ‘defects’ or ‘barriers’ 
that should be isolated from the real business of ‘getting things done’.  
 
For many interviewees, the delivery of the Olympics exemplified what can be done if 
state bodies are delivery-focussed and staffed by private experts, and was often compared 
favourably with perceived ‘failed’ major development projects of the past which had been 
delivered or project managed directly by the public sector and where costs had escalated.  As 
a representative from a private construction firm suggested, the contractual arrangements 
between the private delivery partner [CLM] and the ODA were at the heart of the ‘success’: 
 
We worked in a very incentivised contractual environment with the ODA…   because 
we were incentivised it gave us a lot more freedom to challenge the ODA … typically 
most contracted organisations it’s a hierarchy that flows down. But, what was good 
about the ODA was the sense that it was a new organisation, it had no baggage… A lot 
of similar organisations you might get leading multiple million pound contracts but 
also still having a day job which is, running a railway or keeping the lights on in the 
country or whatever and sometimes that can be a huge distraction to somebody who is 
trying to deliver a capital programme. 
 
It was suggested that London 2012 had succeeded specifically because the ‘politics 
were taken out of it’ (Armitt, 2013). The ODA’s relatively passive approach to knowledge 
capture and the production of a model was essentially based on utilising a range of public and 
private actors promoting their own particular interests converted into a series of governance 
blue prints that could be used to shape the politics and practices of development elsewhere. 
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This ‘London model’ therefore emphasises the importance of strong, dedicated delivery 
institutions, a high degree of interchange between the public and private sectors, strategy 
established very early on and then driven through measurable targets ‘on the ground’, the use 
of contractual obligations to achieve objectives and incentivized management of the 
development process. It is a model focussed on the conversion of messy places into manageable 
and deliverable development spaces.  
 
Many actors involved in the LLA felt that it could act as “a wake-up call for the UK 
construction industry. We can do this and we can use this again for nuclear power, the 
Crossrail3 scheme” (Interview, Construction Firm Director). Talking about the transferability 
of the Olympic experience elsewhere, the same interviewee commented that,  
 
Some would argue that London 2012 was a perfect storm.  What I’ve just said to you: 
cross party support, fully funded, people who wanted to work there because of what it 
was, both companies and individuals, great communication strategy around it, all that 
stuff. People would argue that was a real perfect storm but there are aspects that 
certainly are transferable…. the programme management, the calendar, the baselines... 
an arm’s length client … If you have the right tools it gives the management more data 
and more information to inform their decisions.  So, yes, that’s the long answer.  The 
short answer is yes, they are transferable. 
 
The London Games represented a new model of state-led privatization in which public 
funds and objectives have been converted into privately run and contractually delivered 
                                                           
3 Crossrail is a major rail infrastructure project servicing Central London and the South East of England, which is 
due for completion in 2018.  
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programmes of action, but it is dangerous to tag the London delivery of this one-off event as 
exceptional. As Raco (2012) has argued, the London Olympics was not a ‘game changer’ in 
terms of politics but part of a longer-term emergence of a form of regulatory capitalism “under 
which hybrid relationships emerge between states and powerful corporations, to the point that 
the distinctions between providers and policymakers become increasingly blurred” (p.452). 
These regime changes are not specific to London, but the London Games have presented 
perhaps the clearest demonstration of the emergent ‘what matters is what works’ approach to 
the governance of development. The reputational capital of the success of such an approach in 
London is undeniable in the inevitable ‘travel’ of a so-called ‘London model’ to other cities 
around the world.  The Olympics can therefore be viewed as a “politicized opportunity for 
intervention” (Peck, 2011, p. 778) that provided the platform to enact a preferred strategy of 
privatization and embed normatively pre-figured ‘lessons’ for other projects within the 
technically camouflaged political exercise of the LLA.  
 
The essentialism of ‘London’ to the model produced in part by the apparatus (Roy, 
2012) of the LLA is questionable. One might argue that the LLA process was the original 
collation of a yet-to-be valorised through emulation governance model that emerged within 
place-and-time-specific and politically contingent conditions linked to the Olympic Park 
construction project. Post-Games, however, the ‘London 2012’ moniker became a “badge of 
pride” (Cochrane and Ward, 2012, p. 9) to justify claims of success and marketing to promote 
its emulation and repetition in other contexts.  It has taken on greater significance in the wake 
of UK government efforts to promote greater competitiveness within the British economy and 
London’s longer reputation as a city in which it is particularly difficult to get major 
infrastructure projects completed (see HM Treasury, 2015).  
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Conclusions 
 
The paper has drawn on the example of the London Olympics and the production of an 
institutionalised Learning Legacy Agenda to explore the relationships between urban 
development practices, knowledge production, and the creation and dissemination of wide-
ranging governance models.  It contributes to the burgeoning literature on policy mobilities 
and circulations by documenting the specific types of knowledge that have been produced in a 
high-profile case study, the social and institutional relations that underpinned the process, and 
the work that models and selective knowledge captures are put to.  The examination of the local 
and extra-local intentionalities of mobility outlined in this paper suggests that models for urban 
development practice have morphed into larger scale governmental blueprints.  Projects are not 
seen in isolation but as a part of a broader set of agendas that set in place specific and bounded 
forms of praxis.  We have documented how a new ‘London model’ of development and 
governance has co-emerged along with the national and international narratives of ‘success’ 
associated with the planning and delivery of the 2012 Olympic project.  The model is designed 
to be both place-centred, in its explicit relation to London, and simultaneously generic and 
possessing much wider applicability to ‘urban’ contexts across the world.   The explicit use of 
‘London’ as a form of branding has also deliberately been mobilised to give models a broader 
applicability, given the city’s perceived global status. 
 
The Learning Legacy Agenda has been looked at in detail in order to unpack the 
multiple rationalities of key agents in the social formation and circulation of this model. The 
LLA is not the model itself, but the mechanism for capturing, distilling and pre-packaging 
‘what works’, for transfer elsewhere. Central to the emergent governance narrative has been 
the proclamation by its propagators that success has occurred because the ‘politics has been 
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taken out’ of the development process. The LLA provided a fit-for-purpose apparatus to vaunt 
this illusory feat and illustrate it through the modest (rather than boosterish) compilation of 
“stripped down best practices without need of a supporting discourse” (Interview ODA 
Planner). Indeed, the LLA was not a pre-planned or pre-determined activity, rather a bit of an 
ad hoc after-thought; a bureaucratic side-project. Its origins can be found in the initiative of 
specific individuals within the ODA but its take-up and appropriation extends to an extensive 
social network of high-profile development and governance actors and organisations, not 
merely participating, but more directly driving the agenda forward for a variety of self-
validating purposes. This supports Peck and Theodore’s (2010) observation of the topological 
nature of modern governance; that increasingly the centres of authority are not enshrined in 
government departments and agencies but the complex assemblage of firms, consultancies, 
agencies and organisations that constitute a decentralized governance field.  
 
We have shown how the proclamation of any new model inherently obscures the 
complexities and tensions that prefigure its coherence into a one-dimensional off-the-shelf 
package of best practices. As such the ‘embodied knowledge’ (cf. Roy, 2012) of the ODA-led 
LLA constitutes a powerful governmental technology providing a programmatic template for 
dominant development interests to ‘repeat the trick’ of London 2012.  The ‘London model’ as 
a label may not be embedded in popular lexis to the extent as say the ‘Barcelona model’ or the 
‘Vancouver model’. It is nonetheless iconic in its capacity to cohere a political alliance of state-
led, business-led and sector-led interests around a powerful development project, the Olympic 
Games, and disguise it as a non-political success story of the power of unexceptional technical 
practice, capable of being repeated at various scales and in different international contexts.  The 
representation of a London model is being used post hoc to connect-up a disparate set of policy 
interventions and programmes across the city and cohere them into a transferable narrative (see 
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The Economist, 2012). Moreover, it signifies the extension of a broader political project that 
focuses on the re-tooling of governance arrangements into vehicles that facilitate the 
production of new built environments.  The Olympic example has been used as a model to 
legitimate broader and far-reaching changes to the financing and practices of local government 
in England. There is now increasing emphasis placed on the pursuit of economic growth 
through local authorities prioritising development wherever possible. In line with countries 
such as the United States, there is also a greater reliance on the funding of local infrastructure 
and services through the ‘gains’ that can be captured from ‘viable’ development projects. 
Whilst it would be too strong a claim to argue that the promotion of a London model led to 
such reforms, it is clear that it has played a strong political role in exemplifying what can be 
‘achieved’ through the implementation of a growth-first governmental system.  As we have 
shown, institutional vehicles for the promotion of the model, such as the LLA, have played a 
key role in this wider programme of knowledge circulation. 
 
The paper has explored the ways in which the social relations of knowledge production 
operate and how specific intentionalities and managerial practices become incorporated into 
broader institutional projects and agendas, situated in specific political and economic projects 
and programmes of action.  This paper sought to develop a mid-level theorisation of emergent 
governance narrative or model formation and circulation via a more ‘conjunctural’ (Peck, 
2017) approach to understanding recent transformations in urban governance and development, 
“sceptical of both the universalism and the particularism” (Peck, 2017, p.10) of the 
intentionalities for mobility. In a context of increasing regulatory complexity surrounding 
urban projects and the emergence of powerful corporations that are increasingly able to deliver 
such projects on behalf of state bodies, the power and significance of governance models to 
influence the local politics of urban development in cities is likely to grow.  Off-the-shelf ‘good 
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governance’ models, premised on governmental techniques and arrangements that serve to 
protect technocratic experts from the political disruptions wrought by local agents, will become 
increasingly important as cities across the world use urban projects to meet broader political 
and economic objectives. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: Summary of LLA Documents (Source: UK Government, 2013; Elson, 2013) 
Document Description 
Research Papers Detailed studies completed with partners (using interviews, document 
review and questionnaires) 
Case Studies 3000 word peer-reviewed papers on various topics written internally 
by ODA, CLM etc. or in conjunction internally with partners 
Technical Overview 
Papers 
Special Issues by ICE, IStructE and IET – collection of 6-8 page peer 
reviewed papers describing the construction programme 
Micro-Reports 1-2 page lessons learned, innovations, completed by contractors, 
designers, engineers, CLM, ODA, etc. 
Champion Products Collection of templates, tools and documents that could be usefully 
applied by other projects and programmes 
 
 
Figure 1: Organisations employing practitioners responsible for most LLA documents and the 
themes they were writing about 
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Table 2: List of participating LLA Dissemination Partners  
Association for Project Management 
Business in the Community 
Chartered Institute of Building 
EcoBuild 
Health and Safety Executive 
Institute of Civil Engineers 
Institute of Occupational Safety and Health 
Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors 
Institute of Engineering and Technology 
Landscape Institute 
UK Green Building Council 
 
 
 
 
 
